this great country are based on freedom, I know now why so many Americans have fought and died to preserve this prectous freedom. This may sound like "flag waving" but I do not know of a better flag to wave.

An Interview with Prime Minister George Papandreou of Greece, Conducted by Christopher G. Janus, of Chicago, Ill., Publisher of Greek Heritage

HON. JOHN BRADEMAS

in the house of representatives Wednesday, May 27, 1964

Mr. BRADEMAS. Mr. Speaker, the present crisis in Cyprus makes of particular interest the views on the Cypriot situation of the Prime Minister of

Greece, George Papandreou.

Therefore, I wish to insert in the Record the text of the questions and answers in a recent interview with Prime Minister Papandreou, conducted by a distinguished citizen of Chicago, an investment banker and the publisher of the journal, Greek Heritage, Mr. Christopher G. Janus.

Prime Minister Papandreou and Mr. Janus first became acquainted in 1944–45 when Mr. Janus was chief of the Greek

desk of UNRRA.

Mr. Janus' questions follow:

Mr. Prime Minister, Greece at the present time has an unfavorable press in the United time has an unfavorable press in the United States, especially in such cities as Chicago and the Midwest. Would you please answer a few questions on the Cypriot situation, which might help clear up some of the misunderstandings on the Greek Government's viewpoint about this problem vis-a-vis Cyprus, in particular:

1. Does the Prime Minister feel that the recent change in the Greek Government or the present problems with Cyprus effect in any way the investment and governmental protection of American capital in Greece?

protection of American capital in Greece?

2. As you know, Americans until recently 2. As you know, Americans until recently have considered Greece one of their most favorite countries to visit. Do you feel that there is an anti-American feeling developing in Greece? Is there any truth in the reports in the American press that indeed there may be danger for Americans to visit Greece?

8. Does your Government believe that

there can be a solution of the Cyprus problem without a change in the present constitution of Cyprus?

4. Would the Greek Covernment welcome a union with Cyprus? If so, does your Government feel that such a union is a necessitate.

5. Would you accept a meeting between the Turkish Prime Minister and yourself to discuss the Cypriot question?

6. Will Greece give all-out aid to Cyprus in case of an invasion?

Here are the answers of Greek Prime Minister George Papandreou:

disappointed with the pro-Turkish attitude of a large section of the American press, but of a large section of the American press, but this will not in any way affect their attitude toward the tourists. We also hope that in time there will be a change in the attitude of the American press. The American press should understand that neither coeffice nor Cyprus seek any favored position; neither does Greece seek selfish ends as far as Cyprus is concerned. We just seek justice. We ask that the principle of international justice be applied to Cyprus: that means that the majority should rule and the minority should be duly protected.

8. The present constitution has led to deplorable conditions in Cyprus today. Events have proved that the present constitution cannot be enforced: that's why there is an international army in Cyprus today seeking peace; why there is a mediator in search of a

new political agreement.

4. Greece does not seek union with Cyprus. This decision belongs to the will of the Cypriot people. What we seek for Cyprus is a fully independent government so that the people of Cyprus will be able to decide their own future.

5. I should be very happy to meet the Premier of Turkey, but I do not consider the present political and psychological climate

conducive to the success of such a meeting.

6. We have proclaimed that our policy is peace. In case of an attack on Cyprus, our policy is to defend Cyprus.

Where to in Vietnam?

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

HON. LOUIS C. WYMAN

OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, June 10, 1964

Mr. WYMAN. Mr. Speaker, Congressman Clifford G. McIntire, of Maine, recently prepared comments for delivery to an audience in York County, Maine. Because of a sore throat, the Congressman was unable to present his remarks, and they were very capably delivered by Mrs. McIntire.

In view of the timely character of these comments, I submit them to the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD for the attention

of my colleagues:

COMMENTS OF CONGRESSMAN CLIFFORD G. MCINTIRE, MONDAY EVENING, JUNE 8, AT THE YORK COUNTY COMMITTEE DINNER FOR CANDIDATES AT SANFORD TOWN HALL, SAN-FORD, MAINE

I feel compelled, obliged, to use this opportunity tonight to speak out on a subject which alarms me. We, here in Maine, are a long way off from the strange battlefield in South Vietnam-in miles and in timebut in fact Maine men are involved in this war and each day is bringing this terrible conflict closer to home. The consequences of a defeat or expansion of the battle being fought in South Vietnam will bring the smell and anguish of war into every home in the United States.

This is why I am so concerned. If the policies of the present administration should lead this country deeper into the steaming

cannot be ignored any longer, for if we are to win, the war, the respect, and confidence of the other nations with which we have formed alliances, then we must do more than fumble our way to tragic solutions. We cannot afford another Korea or Laos. Let us look at this war.

A curious situation has developed in South Vietnam. More money is being asked for to wage this seemingly endless war * * * yet. we've been spending in the neighborhood of \$1 million a day to fight an enemy who lives off the land and is equipped with only the barest essentials. We are told that more planes are needed, yet, we find that the aircraft assigned to South Vietnam forces for combat are not being used to fight. I would

We are told that more advisers may be needed. I find it hard to understand how we can win a war with more advice when there is so much evidence that the advice

of our men in South Vietnam is being ignored.

While Laos is being lost, and Cambodia permits the Vietcong a sanctuary, enemy attacks are being stepped up and there is every indication that we can expect them to be intensified. While this is going on we are being told that it may be necessary to expand the war effort. Will someone tell me what is to be gained by expanding the combat zone when we can't successfully defend the present arena? There must be something dramatically wrong, in a situation such as

This war is so fraught with dangers of expansion and explosion that I am surprised at the way in which the Johnson administration treats this terrible affair. I am sure that the American soldiers serving on the battlefield and the families and friends of those who have died in South Vietnam take it yery seriously.

May I suggest that instead of more of everything, that instead of continuing with a policy that has already proven futile, that it is time to demonstrate that that which we have already put into the battle should first

be used effectively. We are being deluged with statements from the Secretary of Defense and many others tied to the administration. Mostly we've heard a long line of excuses for failure or pacifying generalities but always it's more of the same. If more money and equipment are really needed, and I don't doubt this, let us first, at least, start by using that which is already committed. This should not be too much to ask of those in charge of this war. And there should be no need to delay. * * * South Vietnam could be lost while being talked about.

I am not a military man. I would not like to have it thought that I pretended to understand all about the art of warfare. But I can read, I can understand enough about what is going on to ask some ques-Beyond this, one can turn to the history books to see what problems have been faced in the past, how wars were lost, and

One of the things which I find difficult to evaluate is the numeric ratio between the Vietcong and our forces. I have read that we have the enemy outnumbered by 18 to 1, But then I find that the 18 to 1 preponderance of strength which we possess is arrived at by including noncombatant, advisers, and * part-time fighters.

It appears, after reevaluation, that we have the enemy outnumbered by about 5 Minister George Papandreou:

1. The events in Cyprus are not expected to influence the safety and normal development of U.S. capital in Greece.

2. The report which circulated in the American press that the Greece. It is about, Our problems in South Vietnam are true that the Greek people are somewhat to 1. On the face of it, this would appear to be a significant superiority, but no,

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is open to question. This particular combi-tation of numbers is arrived at by comparing the South Vietnam combat forces less the sphervisers, advisers, and part-time fighters with the total force of Communist guer-rillas. Now, many of the enemy are only part-timers or busy in some other fashion if we compare the hard-core forces the figure begings back to 16 to 1 this is according to if we compare the hard-core forces the figure bounces back to 18 to 1, this is, according to Mr. Bernard B. Fall, author of two books on Vietnam and a professor of international relations at Howard University. I'm going to admit that this particular numbers game leaves me confused. Lam inclined to suspect that even the 10-to-1 figure, the magic ratio for deteating guerfilla forces, may be adjustable to suit almost any convenience.

In 8 years of fighting this same enemy, the French fought with a 1.5-to-1 ratio they lost and in Algeria, they used great overwhelm-

and in Algeria, they used great overwhelming strength but still lost.

I don't want to go on with this numbers game analysis of war in South Vietnam. The deeper I read into it the more confusing it becomes. There's even a "kill count" and an "incident count" which are used by Pentagon briefers to prove just about any-thing desired. The numbers arrived at are fust as ludicrous as the figures we've just

finished discussing.

Rising out of the miasmatic collection of facts, there must be something tangible, something we can grasp with confidence. Is more money and all that goes with it the

answer?

I doubt it. There must be some awfully fuzzy thinking going on if anyone really thinks we can buy victory in South Vietnam. I cannot help but recall the millions of dollars and tons of equipment we poured into

Another suggested solution has been to cut Another suggested solution has been to cut off the supply lines of the Victorng. The Ho Chi Minh trail running through Laos is seen as the source of all our trouble, yet, let me quote from Mr. Fall in the March 12 issue of the Reporter, "the huge amounts of U.S. weapons available to the Victorng through capture, theft, or even sale, reduces the importance of the Ho Chi Minh trail, now that the insurgency has reached the point where to a large extent, it feeds on the enemy, in true Mao Tse-tung fashion." In other words, the Vietcong is now using our weapons to defeat us.

The South Vietnam army is considered the The South Vietnam army is considered the best equipped army of its size in the non-Communist world. Why cannot this great force be used more effectively against the Vietcong? If the Vietcong is living in the jungle and swampland, raiding when and where they desire, then it must be time for the South Vietnam army to get out of the helicopters and their barracks, and go into the great areas of land held by the Vietcong, ferret them out, and defeat them in the jungle.

There's another kind of war being fought in South Vietnam. It's the same war that is being battled all over the world, the war for being battled all over the world, the war lor men's mind. Presumably, we are showing the people of the area the advantages of a new freedom-loving way of life. We're cer-tainly spending the money but most of the money seems to be floating around in Saigon and economic assistance being sent to educate and improve the lot of the South Vietnam peasant isn't showing many results. We hear that close to one-third of the

deputation may sympathize with the Viet-cong. This doesn't sound like progress. It's time for us to stop throwing away millions-billions of dollars. It's time to demand con-trol of the money we're shoveling into South

hamlet. The impregnable fortresses fall apart time after time under light attacks due to subversion from within. not mean that the program was necessarily wrong, but how was it carried out?

I could not, nor do I pretend to offer a plan which would guarantee total victory in South Vietnam. I would like to suggest, however, that certain steps should be taken immediately if we are to avert disaster in South Vietnam.

First, let us insist that if we are going to provide the funds and the equipment and American advisers that we have operational control of the war effort in South Vietnam.

Next, we need to get the South Vietnam soldier out into the countryside where the enemy is and not for a few hours but for weeks and months seeking out the enemy and denying him refuge anywhere in South Vietnam he can be resupplied by air, modern communications systems will permit him to close on the enemy with other small units, much as modern police cruisers act in unison to trap escaping criminals, but the most important thing is that he'll be able to capture or destroy the Vietcong and we can do away with the possibility of bombing or burning random villages.

The third step I would advocate would be the intensification of the strategic-hamlet concept. But what good is accomplished by a fortified village that can withstand an enemy attack until relief arrives, if a fifth column is working on the inside? Three things are needed. A village that can hold out until help arrives and this requires a trained and armed militia in every village. Secondly, provision for immediate reaction to a threat against such a hamlet, night or day, land forces must be able to converge on the threatened fortress, attacking the Vietcong and cutting off escape, that's where the soldier in the field, as we have just mentioned, also comes in. And with him, air-carried forces must also be rushed to the trouble spot.

The third thing which must be considered is the problem of sorting out the loyal and disloyal elements. The experts in psycho-logical warfare should be able to accomplish

this objective.

I don't say that my proposals will lead to quick victory, no one has ever suggested that this is possible, but I believe these sugges-tions have real merit. The neutralist policy in Laos based on a troika agreement with the Communists is a failure. To withdraw from southeast Asia will expose the rest of the area to Communist domination. Malaysia and Thailand may be next. Consider the problem then confronting Japan and the Philippines.

Our policy must be clear to friend and foe and the American people have the right to know what is going on and to be kept fully informed.

CONTRACTOR SERVICE

Thank you.

Illinois Federation of Women's Clubs Opposes Altering the Pledge of Allegiance

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

HON. ROMAN C. PUCINSKI

OF ILLINOIS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ILLINOIS FEDERATION OF WOMEN'S CLUBS. Chicago, Ill., May 18, 1964.

Hon. ROMAN C. PUCINSKI, House Office Building,

Washington, D.C.
My Dear Congressman Pucinski: The Illinois Federation of Women's Clubs in its 69th annual convention, May 5, 6, 7, 1964, assembled in Chicago, with Mrs. Vernon E. Barnes presiding, unanimously adopted the following resolution:

"Whereas there is presently a movement to delete the words "under God" from the Pledge of Allegiance to the Flag of the United States of America: Therefore

"Resolved, That the Illinois Federation of Women's Clubs make known to the General Federation of Women's Clubs and to the proper Government officials that the Illinois federation is opposed to any such deletion.

"Mrs. G. PREDERICK GOULD, President 11th District, IFWC. "Mrs. V. V. Holmberg, President, Third District, IFWC."

We believe that it speaks for itself and trust that you will make every effort to retain the words "under God" in the pledge. Very truly yours.

Mrs. JAMES M. SEGRAVES,

President.

Staten Island Zoological Society, Inc.

EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF

HON. JOHN M. MURPHY

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Wednesday, June 10, 1964

Mr. MURPHY of New York, Speaker, under leave to extend my remarks in the RECORD, I would like to include a statement of the Staten Island Zoological Society, Inc., which was prepared to aid the industries on Staten Island in their thinking about a contribution to the Children's Zoo project at Barrett Park:

The Children's Zoo is a project sponsored by the Staten Island Zoological Society that will be a part of a 10-year master plan for expansion of Barrett Park. The board of trustees of the society feels that this project is necessary because of the population growth of Staten Island and because of the educational value of this type of exhibit for approximately 20,000 children between the ages of 1 and 8 who live on Staten Island. (The syllabus for science in the primary grades calls for a visit to this type of exhibit where children can observe, pet, and feed domestic animals.)

As of this writing, the Staten Island Chamber of Commerce, the assistant super-intendent of schools, the commissioner of parks, the borough president, and many interested individuals have voiced their support of this project. The Staten Island Advance, editorially, backs this project and has pledged priority publicity until it is

completed. The Staten Island Zoo at Barrett Park is unique among zoos in the world. It is small, yet its diversity of live animal exhibits attracts visitors from all over the world. (In the beginning months of the World's Fair, several European visitors have made trips to the Staten Island Zoo to view the exhibits.) Worldwide fame has come to vietnam, and also, time to demand control of the military and economic programs in South Vietnam which we are paying for.

I believe that the strategic hamlet concept was well founded pand vietnam which we are paying for.

Mr. PUCINSKI. Mr. Speaker, the follows:

Mr. PUCINSKI. Mr. S